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Regulatory Takings:
The Supreme Court Runs Out of Gas
in San Diego T
DOUGLAS W. KMIEC*
Deciding whether an overzealous exercise of the police power requires
the payment of just compensation under the fifth amendment-the so-
called "taking issue"-has never been one of the Supreme Court's driv-
ing ambitions. The issue is of particular significance to landowners,
however, because the proliferation of land use and environmental regula-
tions and the specialized entities which spawn them has increased the
probability of a regulatory wipeout.
Although the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in San
Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego' failed to resolve the taking
issue, Justice Brennan's dissent,2 in which Justices Stewart, Marshall, and
Powell joined and with which Justice Rehnquist substantially agreed,3
clarifies the Court's position with regard to whether the exercise of the
police power can ever be a taking, and if so, what remedy is constitu-
tionally required.
In an analysis focusing on the decision in San Diego and Justice Bren-
nan's dissenting opinion, this article briefly reviews the Supreme Court's
handling of the taking issue. The article then examines three issues not
addressed by Justice Brennan. First, it explores governmental immunity
and explains why immunity principles developed under analogous section
1983 cases may apply. Second, the issue of whether legislative and admin-
istrative remedies must be exhausted as a prerequisite to a judicial deter-
mination of a taking is considered. Third, the damage question is examined
in detail. The discussion reveals that the question may be far more un-
t Copyright 1982 by Douglas W. Kmiec. All rights reserved.
* B.A. 1973, Northwestern University, J.D. 1976, University of Southern California.
Associate Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame. Member, Illinois and California Bars.
1 101 S. Ct. 1287 (1981).
2 Id. at 1296 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
I Justice Rehnquist concurred in the majority opinion which found the absence of a
final judgment below to preclude the Court's jurisdiction. However, Justice Rehnquist stated
that had there been a final judgment, he "would have little difficulty agreeing with much
of what is said in the dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan." Id. at 1294 (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring). Moreover, the majority opinion written by Justice Blackmun admitted that
the "federal constitutional aspects of [the taking] issue are not to be cast aside lightly
.... " Id. at 1294 (majority opinion).
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settled than Justice Brennan indicated. After exploring whether damages
should serve a compensatory or redistributive function, the discussion
proceeds to treat separately the calculation of interim and permanent
damages and the difficulties likely to be encountered. The analysis con-
cludes by proposing a set of principles to be applied to the calculation
of damages in the regulatory taking context.
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE TAKING ISSUE
The seemingly absolute protection of the fifth amendment, which pro-
vides that "private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without
just compensation,"4 often has proven harshly illusory for landowners who
have invested significant sums in reliance upon zoning and subdivision
regulations.' For almost thirty-five years, land use matters were on the
road not taken by the Court.' Even when the Court ventured onto the
path of land development issues, its protection of valuable property rights
was limited and generally unsatisfactory.
The Court's excursion into land use matters began more than half a
century ago in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,' in which it sustained
the validity of the Village of Euclid's zoning ordinance notwithstanding
a resulting diminution of seventy-five percent in the value of Ambler's
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
A recent comment noted:
The regulation of property is nonactionable so long as the property owner
is left with some minimum, residual value in his land. Owners may not be
compensated for mere reduction in value. Once the scale tips so that instead
of an 80 or even 90 percent devaluation the amount of loss is 100 percent,
an owner may sue for and recover the entire lost value of his land. Although
there seems to be a kind of bottom-line justice in salving the largest wound,
the property owner of land devalued by 90 percent, but not by the magical
higher increment, must perceive legal reasoning to be totally awry.
Meyer & Dolle, Changing Compensation Rules for Property Takings, REAL EST. REV., Spring
1981, at 28, 30 (emphasis in original).
The Supreme Court has held that diminution in value is relevant, but not a determinative
issue. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). One of the reasons
it is not determinative may be that calculating a landowner's investment is often difficult.
For example, Professor Berger asks:
Do we look at what [a landowner] paid for the parcel or at its current market
value? If current market value, do we consider the impact of'the control itself
upon that value? [If the landowner] had actually sold off more than two-thirds
of his frontage before the lawsuit began, how should the sales transaction
alter the investment base? If [the landowner] has already recouped his original
outlay, does he have any investment base in the remainder? Easy answers
do not leap to mind.
Berger, The Accommodation Power in Land Use Controversies: A Reply to Professor Costonis,
76 COLUM. L. REV. 799,819 (1976). See generally R. ELLICKSON & A.D. TARLOCK, LAND-USE CON-
TROLS 134-36 (1981).
' Blumstein, A Prolegomenon to Growth Management and Exclusionary Zoning Issues,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., Spring 1979, at 5, 81.
272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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property. Subsequent decisions of the Court largely followed Euclid ex-
cept when either the landowner could accomplish the Herculean task of
proving that the particular land use measure failed to promote the general
welfare'-for which invalidation was the remedy'-or the regulation was
accompanied by some physical invasion' 0-for which compensation was
grudgingly awarded for a limited property interest such as an easement.
When a government with a facially valid public purpose so regulated land
that its value was virtually-but not totally-destroyed, however, the
landowner generally was left remediless. 11
The Court apparently never has felt entirely comfortable with this posi-
tion, because of both the express terms of the fifth amendment and Justice
Holmes' cryptic assertion that "while property may be regulated to a cer-
tain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." 2
Nevertheless, since Justice Holmes' statement the Court has .yet to find
that a land use regulation"3 went "too far," notwithstanding the vigorous
arguments of landowners to the contrary. In Penn Central Transporta-
tion Co. v. New York City,4 the Court upheld a regulation requiring that
the owners of the Grand Central Terminal maintain it as a landmark,
even though the regulation greatly limited their ability to exploit their
property interests. 5 The Court affirmed Justice Holmes' statement, but
confined it to cases in which the landowner could demonstrate that the
regulation left the property economically nonviable1 -a concept which
remains largely undefined.
' Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
' In his dissenting opinion in San Diego, Justice Brennan suggested that the govern-
ment also may be liable to the landowner for damages "under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 for a Four-
teenth Amendment due process violation." 101 S. Ct. at 1306 n.23 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The cited provision is the current version of the part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch.
22, S 1, 17 Stat. 13 (amended 1979), which provides a possible remedy whenever anyone
acting under color of state law deprives a person of federal rights, privileges, or immunities.
Under Justice Brennan's analysis, damages are not available directly under the fifth
amendment, because regulation which does not promote the general welfare implicitly does
not fulfill the "public use" requirement of that amendment. But cf Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26 (1954) (giving little, if any, weight to the public use requirement).
10 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946). -
" See, e.g., Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972) (upholding
a shoreland zoning ordinance which prohibited all but natural uses, such as harvesting
wild crops); HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365
(1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976) (upholding a rezoning from commercial to single
family residential notwithstanding an 80% reduction in value).
12 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
I Cf. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (assertion of federal naviga-
tional servitude which interferes with landowner's investment-backed expectations requires
compensation).
" 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
, Id. at 135-36.
"Id. at 138 n.36.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Even though proving economic nonviability may be difficult, 7 the way
seemed clear after Penn Central for landowners to obtain compensation
for overzealous police power18 regulation. This at least was the situation
when the California Supreme Court decided Agins v. City of Tiburon,9
which held either that the remedy for regulatory takings was limited to
invalidation and never included monetary relief, or that as a matter of
federal constitutional law, an exercise of the police power, no matter how
arbitrary or excessive, could never constitute a taking.' The United States
Supreme Court, in its opinion in Agins, sidestepped the issue raised by
this seemingly new impediment to resolving the taking issue. The Court
held that the mere enactment of a zoning ordinance which permitted con-
struction of up to five dwellings on a five-acre tract like that of appellants
did not rise to a constitutional deprivation."
THE SAN DIEGO DECISION
With this background, the road to San Diego .was unobstructed. San
Diego Gas & Electric Co. (the utility) owned property in northwest San
Diego on which it intended to put a nuclear generating station and which
was zoned partly industrial and partly agricultural.' Before the utility
17 After the Supreme Court's decision in Penn Central, Professor Blumstein speculated
that the decision may reflect "an even further erosion of constitutional protections for
property interests." Blumstein, supra note 6, at 89 n.606. It appeared to remove the diminu-
tion in value or economic viability issue from the Court's primary area of concern. In this
regard, Professor Blumstein remarked:
If the nature and degree of private harm are no longer mainstays of the
threshold categorization decision, then it will be a lot easier to characterize
a governmental action as falling under the police power rather than the emi-
nent domain power. That done, it will be difficult to rule in favor of a land-
owner in an economic substantive due process context, despite the reasonable
beneficial use language of Penn Central, because of the Court's overwhelming
reluctance to reenter the arena of active economic substantive due process
review. The skeptical view, therefore, is that Penn Central withdraws con-
sideration of private harm at the only point at which, pragmatically, it could
really matter, and places it instead within an analytical context wherein it
is doomed to desuetude.
Id. at 89 n.606.
The police power must be distinguished from that of eminent domain. In general,
"it may be said that the state takes property by eminent domain because it is useful to
the public, and under the police power because it is harmful .... From this results the
difference ... that the former recognizes a right to compensation, while the latter on prin-
ciples does not." E. FREUND, THE POLICE POWER 546-47 (1904). Cf. D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLAN-
NING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW S 180 (1971) (other formulations of the distinction).
'9 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979).
For the reason for this equivocation on the statement of the holding, see note 36 infra.
2' Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). The Court did not consider whether
a taking would have resulted when the ordinance was applied specifically to the Agins
property because the landowner had yet to submit a specific development plan. Id. at 262.
101 S. Ct. at 1289-90.
[Vol. 57:45
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could undertake any industrial use, the city adopted an open-space plan
and proposed a bond issue to acquire open-space lands, including the prop-
erty in issue.' When the bond issue failed, the utility sued for mandamus,
declaratory relief, and damages.4
After a bench trial on the issue of liability, a jury awarded damages
in excess of three million dollars, pursuant to the finding that the open-
space designation deprived the utility of "all practical, beneficial or
economic use of the property" The trial court reached this conclusion
by glossing over two factors which indicated that the property still might
have been economically viable. First, as a chartered city, San Diego was
not statutorily required to follow its open-space plan28 and hence might
have permitted industrial or other development." The record established,
however, that the city followed a "policy of enacting and enforcing zon-
ing ordinances that were consistent with its open-space plan."28 Second,
the taking asserted by the utility could have been characterized as par-
tial because the regulation affected 214 acres even though the utility
owned 412 contiguous acres.' Nevertheless, the trial court summarily con-
cluded that both "'the property designated as open space and the re-
mainder of the larger parcel is unmarketable.' "30
Notwithstanding these uncertainties, the California Court of Appeal
affirmed,3' but the California Supreme Court remanded for reconsidera-
tion in light of its intervening opinion in Agins32 In an unpublished opin-
Id. at 1290.
Id. at 1290-91.
2 Id. at 1291.
Id. at 1290-91. See CAL. GOVT CODE §S 65700, 65803 (West 1966 & Supp. 1979).
The open-space plan acknowledged the utility's ownership of the property and the
utility's intent to use part of the property as a nuclear power plant. 101 S. Ct. at 1290.
The plan stated that "'such a facility, if sensitively designed and sited, could be compati-
ble with open space preservation in this subsystem; however, a number of approvals and
clearances must be obtained prior to the plant's construction becoming a reality. " Id. n.5.
The utility abandoned its plan to construct a nuclear power plant after discovery of an
off-shore fault that rendered the project unfeasible. Id. n.6.
Id. at 1291.
See id. at 1289 n.2.
Id. at 1291. It is not clear whether the "remainder" referred to by the trial court
was the 15 acres that the trial court had found to be damaged by severance from the
larger parcel or was the balance of the property owned by the utility. In any case, the
court's conclusion appears to be erroneous because the utility had already received a substan-
tial return on its original $3.5 million investment by selling some 40 acres for $1.7 million
and including the original purchase price in its rate base which guaranteed the utility an
annual rate of return of more than eight percent on the property. See Duerksen & Mantell,
Interim Damages: A Remedy in Land Use Cases?, LAND USE L. &*ZONING DIG., Apr. 1981,
at 6, 11 & n.21; Erratum, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., May 1981, at 11.
-1 Cal. App. 3d , 146 Cal. Rptr. f03 (1978). This decision was vacated and deprived
of all effect by the California Supreme Court's grant of the city's petition for hearing.
101 S. Ct. at 1291 (citing Knouse v. Nimocks, 8 Cal. 2d 482, 483-84, 66 P.2d 438, 438-39
(1937); CAL. R. CT. 976(d), 977).
' 101 S. Ct. at 1291.
1982]
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ion, the Court of Appeal reversed itself and found that Agins precluded
the damage award." The Court of Appeal was even unwilling to invalidate
the offending regulation under Agins.Y
When the California Supreme Court denied further review35 and the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, the Court seemed to
have reached the last roadblock to compensable regulatory takings. It
had not. Because the Supreme Court could not agree on the holding of
the California Supreme Court in Agins,0 the majority seized upon this
disagreement, and the California Court of Appeal's failure to invalidate
the regulation, as indications that disputed fact issues remained.' Hence,
the Supreme Court dismissed for want of jurisdiction due to the absence
of a final judgment. 8
JUSTICE BRENNAN'S DISSENT
Justice Brennan, with whom three other members of the Court joined,'
thought that the majority seriously mischaracterized the opinion below."
Id. at 1292.
The reason for this unwillingness is disputed. Compare id. at 1293-94 (Court of Appeal
remanded for determination of whether taking occurred) with id. at 1297 (Brennan, J., dissen-
ting) ("the Court of Appeal held that the city's exercise of its police power ... could not
constitute a 'taking' . . ." as a matter of law).
Id. at 1293 (majority opinion).
Justice Blackmun for the majority stated:
Contrary to the dissent's argument, the California Supreme Court's Agins deci-
sion did not hold that a zoning ordinance never could be a "taking" and thus
never could violate tie Just Compensation Clause. It simply limited the remedy
available for any such violation to nonmonetary relief....
We believe, therefore, that it is the dissent that "fundamentally mischar-
acterizes" . . . the California ruling.
Id. at 1292 n.8 (emphasis in original). In contrast, Justice Brennan in dissent argued, "With
all due respect, [the majority's] conclusion misreads the holding of the Court of Appeal[which decided] [in faithful compliance with the instructions of the California Supreme Court's
opinion in Agins v. City of Tiburon .... Id. at 1297 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
In a footnote, Justice Brennan pointed out that
[ilt is not merely linguistic coincidence that the California Supreme Courtin Agins never analyzed the Tiburon zoning ordinance to determine whether
a Fifth Amendment "taking" without just compensation had occurred. Instead,
the court noted that "a zoning ordinance may be unconstitutional and subject
to invalidation only when its effect is to deprive the landowner of substantial-
ly all reasonable use of his property," and that "[t]he ordinance before us had
no such effect."
Id. at 1298' n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied by Justice Brennan).
Id. at 1292-94 (majority opinion).
Id. at 1294. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976) the Supreme Court is granted jurisdiction
to review only "[flinal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in
which a decision could be had."
' Justice Rehnquist, concurring, literally interpreted the concept of final judgment, con-
trary to the Court's opinion in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). 101
S. Ct. at 1295 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
" 101 S. Ct. at 1296 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 57:45
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Justice Rehnquist concurred in the majority's dismissal while otherwise
embracing "much of' Justice Brennan's position.41
It is difficult to understand why the majority semantically obscured
the federal constitutional issue squarely raised by the California Supreme
Court. After all, is there any real difference between characterizing Agins
as holding that the remedy for regulatory takings is limited to invalida-
tion' or as holding that regulations can never be takings, but only depriva-
tions subject to invalidation? 3 Justice Brennan demonstrated in passing
that there is no real difference" and also illustrated the tremendous im-
portance of dealing with the just compensation issue, even assuming
arguendo the presence of disputed fact issues in the record below. 5 The
California Court of Appeal, in compliance with Agins, "held that the city's
exercise of its police power, however arbitrary or excessive, could not
as a matter of federal constitutional law constitute a 'taking' "46 and that
an invalid police power exercise "does not require compensation; rather
the party's remedy is administrative mandamus."" The consequent
dismissal denied relief as a matter of law, not of fact.'8 No trial court
resolution of factual questions would have had any effect on the constitu-
tional position- denying compensatory awards for such exercises of police
power-required by the California Supreme Court in Agins.
The dissenting opinion also recognized the importance of monetary
relief.'9 A monetary remedy is important largely because the alternative,
invalidation, is so inadequate. As the San Diego case history demonstrates,
invalidation results only after protracted litigation in which a landowner,
against incredible odds, proves that his property has been rendered worth-
less by regulation.' However, invalidation does not mean that the land-
owner can proceed to develop his land. In fact, it often means just the
opposite, since the landowner then faces a hostile local government, which
not only has an arsenal of other controls with which to stymie the land-
owner, but also, may have enough malevolent creativity to enact a regula-
tion only slightly less restrictive than the one invalidated to start the
litigation game all over again.'
" Id. at 1294 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
Id. at 1293.
, I. at 1297 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1298-1300.
s Id. at 1301.





See id. at 1289-93 (majority opinion).
51 With regard to the San Diego litigation, Justice Brennan noted:
The instant litigation is a good case in point. The trial court, on April 9,
1976, found that the city's actions effected a "taking" of appellant's property
on June 19, 1973. If true, then appellant has been deprived of all beneficial
1982]
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Thus, as the Court was then constituted, 2 four Justices were on record
as having endorsed monetary compensation for unduly harsh land regula-
tion. Apparently, Justice Rehnquist agreed.' This endorsement brushed
aside a wide array of local government policy arguments against
compensation.' Specifically, Justice Brennan dismissed the argument that
land use planning would be inhibited or "chilled" if monetary compensa-
tion became a possible remedy. Justice Brennan conceded that some
government action may be forestalled, but suggested that uninhibited land
use planning which considers benefits, but not costs, may be irrational.'
Justice Brennan correctly perceived that the "chilling" argument is a
perverse twist on constitutional theory, since the concern should be
whether the constitutional right to private property, not the interven-
tion of government, is chilled or diminished.' In addition, the dissent was
equally unimpressed by the belief, long held by governmental officials
and some commentators,57 that a government can only be held liable when
it "intends" to take property. Justice Brennan noted that "police power
regulations such as zoning ordinances and other land use restrictions can
destroy the use and enjoyment of property in order to promote the public
good just as effectively as formal condemnation or physical invasion of
property." Concluding, Justice Brennan aptly observed that "the appli-
use of its property in violation of the Just Compensation Clause for the past
seven years.
Invalidation hardly prevents enactment of subsequent unconstitutional regula-
tions by the government entity. At the 1974 annual conference of the Na-
tional Inititute of Municipal Law Officers in California, a California City At-
torney gave fellow city attorneys the following advice: "IF ALL ELSE FAILS,
MERELY AMEND THE REGULATION AND START OVER AGAIN."
Id. at 1305 n.22 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Longtin, Avoiding and Defending Constitu-
tional Attacks on Land Use Regulations, 38B NIMLO MUN. L. REv. 192-93 (1975)).
Justice Stewart has since resigned from the Court.
While the Supreme Court has never decided whether an action for damages is possi-
ble against a municipality under the just compensation clause, the lower federal courts
have consistently heard actions for regulatory taking damages. See, e.g., Foster v. City
of Detroit, 405 F.2d 138, 144 (6th Cir. 1968), affjg 254 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Mich. 1966); Miller
v. County of Los Angeles, 341 F.2d 964, 966 (9th Cir. 1965); Foster v. Herley, 330 F.2d
87, 90 (6th Cir. 1964); Lowe v. Manhatten Beach City School Dist., 222 F.2d 258, 259-60
(9th Cir. 1955); Amen v. City of Dearborn, 363 F. Supp. 1267, 1270 (E.D. Mich. 1973); Sayre
v. United States, 282 F. Supp. 175, 181-85 (N.D. Ohio 1967).
" See, e.g., Beuscher, Some Tentative Notes on the Integration of Police Power and Emi-
nent Domain by the Courts: So-Called Inverse or Reverse Condemnation, 1968 URB. L. ANN.
1. For a catalog of the arguments for and against compensation, see Costonis, "Fair" Com-
pensation and the Accommodation Power: Antidotes for the Taking Impasse in Land Use Con-
troversies, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1021, 1071-72 (1975).
101 S. Ct. at 1308 n.26 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
' This argument was made forcefully in Brief for Appellant at 19-20, Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
5 E.g., Duerksen & Mantell, supra note 30, at 9.
101 S. Ct. at 1304 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 57:45
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cability of express constitutional guarantees is not a matter to be deter-
mined on the basis of policy judgments . ... 9
ISSUES LEFT UNADDRESSED AND UNRESOLVED
Even if the Court should soon hear another regulatory taking case and
officially adopt Justice Brennan's approach, several issues remain unre-
solved. For example, because the approach contemplates damages outside
the formal condemnation process, it implicitly indicates that a govern-
mental entity which does not possess eminent domain authority could none-
theless be held liable for a regulatory taking. The slight existing prece-
dent, however, is to the contrary.' Besides this rather technical point,
the three most important issues which remain open concern governmen-
tal immunity, exhaustion of remedies, and the purpose and calculation
of damages.
Governmental Immunity
Justice Brennan did not address what, if any, governmental immunities
are to apply. Obviously, because federal rights are involved, no immunity
originating under state law will defeat liability." It is less obvious, but
no less clear, that a government ought not to be immune from liability
for land use decisions merely because its decisions are discretionary. While
one commentator has suggested that the Court has yet to definitively
address this issue,' the Court's statement in Owen v. City ofIndependence6
that a municipality has "no discretion to violate the Federal Constitution '"
seems sufficiently unambiguous. If the government could draw a discre-
tionary shield around its land use regulations, then much, if not all, of
Justice Brennan's position on the compensability of regulatory takings
would make little sense.6 5
1, Id. at 1308.
61 See Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 566 F.2d 1353, 1358 (9th Cir. 1977),
affid in part & rev'd in part sub nom., Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Plan-
ning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979); Gregory v. City of New York, 346 F. Supp. 140, 143 (S.D.N.Y.
1972). Cf. Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 474 F. Supp. 901 (D. Nev. 1979)
(absence of power to condemn prevented liability under S 1983).
11 In Jones v. Marshall, 528 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1975), the Second Circuit stated that "[a]
state rule of immunity or privilege which allows a state officer to escape liability for a
deprivation of 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United
States' is simply not controlling under 42 U.S.C. S 1983." Id. at 137. See also T & M Homes,
Inc. v. Township of Mansfield, 162 N.J. Super. 497, 393 A.2d 613 (1978).
02 Carlisle, The Evolution of Section 1983-Verdict In on Liability but Jury Out on Remedy,
12 URB. LAW. 727, 732 & n.20 (1980).
63 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
"Id. at 649. See generally Note, The Municipal Zoning Power and Section 1983 Liability
After Owen v. City of Independence, 12 Loy. CHI. L.J. 209 (1991).
" Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1198 & n.20 (6th Cir. 1981).
1982]
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However, certain federal immunities may apply, particularly those
defenses and immunities available under analogous cases brought under
section 1983.1 Absent a clear holding that damages were available directly
under the fifth amendment for a regulatory taking, landowners have
turned to section 1983 for relief6 7 While the statute itself suggests ab-
solute liability, the Court has incorporated into section 1983 immunities
well-established in common law at the time of its enactment.'
Most immunity principles developed under section 1983 probably will
carry over to actions premised directly upon the fifth amendment. Out-
side the land use area, the Court has held that it is "untenable to draw
a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against
state officials under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitu-
tion against federal officials. 6 9 It seems unlikely that a different rule will
apply in the land use context or that it is tenable to distinguish suits
brought against state officials under section 1983 from those brought
directly under the Constitution. Neverthless, these issues are unresolved.
Because the immunity-law policy of balancing the need for governmental
discretion against the protection of constitutional interests is the same
in both contexts, there appears to be little reason to complicate further
an already confused area. 0
42 U.S.C. S 1983 (Supp. III 1979). This section provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation; custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory of the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im-
munities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
A growing number of cases hold that damages may be recovered for the overregula-
tion of land under § 1983. See, e.g., Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979); Rogin v. Bensalem Township, 616 F.2d 680 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 101 S. Ct. 1737 (1981); Rogers v. Tolson, 582 F.2d 315 (4th Cir. 1978); Cordeco Dev.
Corp. v. Santiago Vasquez, 539 F.2d 256 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 978 (1976).
" In Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951), for example, the Court explored the
question of absolute immunity for state legislators. The Court held that such an immunity
existed at common law when S 1983 was enacted. Moreover, the Court stressed that such
an immunity was necessary for the proper functioning of the democratic process because
legislators otherwise would hesitate to exercise their independent judgment because of
the threat of liability. Cf. Peirson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (absolute immunity extended
to judges); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409. (1976) (absolute immunity extended to
prosecutors).
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S..478, 504 (1978) (emphasis added).
o One area of confusion under the S 1983 cases which directly affects land use litigation
concerns the type of immunity local officials should be accorded. The lower federal courts
are split on the issue. Compare Fralin and Waldron, Inc. v. County of Henrico, 474 F. Supp.
1315 (E.D. Va. 1979) (finding county supervisors and planning commissioners entitled to
absolute immunity), with Thomas v. Younglove, 545 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1976) (finding coun-
ty supervisors entitled to qualified immunity) and M.J. Brock & Sons, Inc. v. City of Davis,
401 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (finding planning commissioners entitled to qualified
immunity).
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Assuming that immunities under section 1983 case law do apply, land
use decisionmakers may be able to rely upon absolute legislative and
judicial immunity. Of course, what is legislative or judicial in the land
use context is unclear,71 and hence, some land use officials - especially
administrators who implement, rather than devise, land use plans-may
be afforded only qualified immunity. Qualified immunity protects only of-
ficials who act in both objective and subjective good faith." Moreover,
deciding which immunity applies outside the land use context has divid-
ed the federal courts, although the Supreme Court has indicated that the
officials' challenged functions, rather than the legislative denomination
of the entity to which they belong, is determinative.7"
With respect to entity immunity, the eleventh amendment immunizes
states from damage liability. 4 Because most land use regulations originate
with local or county government, however, this immunity is not particular-
ly significant.75 What is significant is that the Supreme Court has held
that local government lacks even qualified immunity from liability under
section 1983. Thus, a local government cannot use the good faith of its
officers as a defense."
Exhaustion of Remedies
If municipalities, and perhaps even local land use officials, are not im-
mune from damage liability under the foregoing principles, there still is
The Supreme Court has yet to decide whether individuals performing legislative func-
tions at the purely local level, as opposed to the regional level, should be afforded absolute
immunity from federal damage claims. Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Plan-
ning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 404 & n.26 (1979).
71 Compare Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973) (holding
that rezoning decisions on specific pieces of property are judicial), with State v. City of
Rochester, 268 N.W.2d 885 (Minn. 1978) (expressly rejecting the Fasano holding and main-
taining the more customary view that rezonings are legislative and thus presumed valid).
See also Harris, Rezoning-Should It Be a Legislative or Judicial Function?, 31 BAYLOR L.
REV. 409 (1979); Sullivan, Araby Revisited: The Evolving Concept of Procedural Due Process
Before Land Use Regulatory Bodies, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 50 (1974).
7 See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321-22 (1975).
" See generally Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Auth., 440 U.S.
391 (1979); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975). In Wood the Court noted that "school
board members function at different times in the nature of legislators and adjudicators
in the school disciplinary process." 420 U.S. at 319.
71 E.g., Bennett v. Gravelle, 323 F. Supp. 203 (D. Md. 1971), af'd, 451 F.2d 1101 (4th
Cir. 1971).
7 See, e.g., Atkins v. City of Charlotte, 296 F. Supp. 1068, 1072-73 (D.N.C. 1969) (holding
that eleventh amendment does not extend immunity to governmental units smaller than
state).
71 Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
7 Id. at 638. Of course, the local government may claim that its officer acted without
official sanction, and thus may avoid liability because "a municipality cannot be held liable
under section 1983 on a respondeat superior theory." Monell v. Department of Social Servs.,
436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
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the question of when damage liability arises. The issue includes whether
an aggrieved landowner must exhaust legislative and administrative
remedies before filing an action for damages, and whether damages ac-
crue while such remedies are being exhausted.
An exhaustion requirement may be justified in the land use context
because without exhaustion municipalities would be subject to unexpected
liability." Because this argument is a variation of the government's argu-
ment that any damage awards would "chill" effective land use regulation,'
one might have expected it to be rejected outright on the basis of Justice
Brennan's refusal in San Diego to subject constitutional guarantees to
policy judgments." However, that Justice Brennan's opinion did not set-
tle the issue is illustrated by the decision of the Sixth Circuit in Her-
nandez v. City of Lafayette.81
Decided two months after San Diego, the Hernandez opinion was con-
cerned primarily with a landowner's claim for damages under section 1983
and with the propriety of the district court's grant of summary judgment
for the city and mayor who together failed for more than two years to
act definitively on the landowner's rezoning requests, largely because the
city wanted to acquire part of the land for a right-of-way and was fearful
that the rezoning would increase the ultimate purchase price.' The Sixth
Circuit affirmed the lower court's finding of absolute immunity for the
mayor, but not for the city." In so doing, the court took note of Justice
Brennan's opinion in San Diego and in dicta commented upon the exhaus-
tion issue.'
The Hernandez court hypothesized that a zoning classification could
result in a taking either because circumstances changed after its initial
passage or because the classification denied a landowner an economically
viable use from its inception. 5 In either event, the court determined that
no taking would occur until "the municipality's governing body is given
a realistic opportunity and reasonable time within which to review its
zoning legislation vis-a-vis the particular property and to correct the
inequity."8 In a footnote, the Hernandez opinion suggested that a land-
" See Hall, Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto: Aberration or New Direction in Land Use Law?,
28 HASTINGS L.J. 1569 (1977). The author states: "This threat of an unanticipated financial
liability will intimidate legislative bodies and will discourage the implementation of strict
or innovative planning measures in favor of measures which are less stringent, more tradi-
tional and physically safe." Id. at 1597, cited with approval in Agins v. City of Tiburon,
24 Cal. 3d 366, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), afj'd, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
See text accompanying note 56 supra.
101 S. Ct. at 1308.
81 643 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 1191.






owner must exhaust his legislative remedies by petitioning the city coun-
cil for a rezoning.Y Moreover, the court indicated that no damages accrue
to the landowner until the available remedies have been exhausted., Thus,
under the Hernandez opinion, no taking occurs until all proceedings to
review and correct a zoning classification are completed.
One commentator approved of the Hernandez interpretation of the Bren-
nan opinion because the "government does not always recognize that it
has taken property [and] [i]t sometimes needs to have its attention
focused. ' Others have recommended an exhaustion requirement in order
to provide the landowner with an incentive to mitigate damages."
However, these recommendations are contrary to traditional land use prac-
tice, and arguably the spirit, if not the letter, of Justice Brennan's opinion.
Legislative Remedies
Generally, in order to attack the constitutionality of legislation, a land-
owner need not ask the legislature to repeal it." This principle was ade-
quately articulated by Justice Sutherland in Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty when he noted that the landowner's suit was proper even though
the landowner had made no effort to obtain a building permit or to apply
to the zoning board of appeals for relief.1 This is not to suggest that
it is inadvisable to exhaust every credible remedy before litigating,
especially in view of the cost of litigation. The advisability of exhaustion
is further increased by the Supreme Court's consistent refusal to con-
sider more than the facial constitutionality of a land use regulation ab-
sent its actual application to the landowner. Until a landowner submits
17 Id. & n.27. The court suggested that the landowner also may contest the initial general
zoning regulation prior to its passage. Id.
U Id. at 1201.
, Hagman, Temporary or Interim Damages Awards in Land Use Control Cases, 4 ZON-
ING & PLAN. L. REP. 129, 134 (1981).
90 E.g., Badler, Municipal Zoning Liability in Damages-A New Cause of Action, 5 URB.
LAW. 25, 53 (1973).
"1 R. ELLICKSON & A.D. TARLOCK, supra note 5, at 77; accord, 4 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN
LAW OF ZONING S 27.14, at 341 (2d ed. 1977) (discussing injunctive relief). But see 1 J. METZEN-
BAUM, THE LAW OF ZONING 744 (2d ed. 1955). For a good discussion of each position, see Com-
ment, Exhausting Administrative and Legislative Remedies in Zoning Cases, 48 TULANE L.
REV. 665, 674-77 (1974).
92 Id. at 386.
" In each of the last three major land use cases considered, the Court indicated that
the landowner had failed to apply for specific permission for development. San Diego Gas
& Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 101 S. Ct. 1287, 1290 n.5 (1981); Agins v. City of Tiburon,
447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 136-37
(1978). It is not clear whether the Court was advocating the pursuit of legislative or adminis-
trative remedies in each of these cases. In Penn Central and Agins, the initial authority
for applying the regulation appears to have been administrative-the Landmarks Preser-
vation Commission, 438 U.S. at 110, and the local planning agency, see CAL. GOV'T CODE
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a development plan, has the plan rejected, and proves that any remain-
ing permitted use is economically nonviable, the Court will presume that
land use officials will not construe their own regulation contrary to the
Constitution. 4 Thus, although the practical importance of exhausting
available remedies cannot be overstated, particularly because it con-
tributed to the absence of a final judgment in San Diego,95 it would be
misleading to characterize legislative exhaustion as a traditional
requirement.
Administrative Remedies
Although the exhaustion of administrative remedies is more common-
ly required," the requirement is subject to numerous exceptions. For ex-
ample, administrative remedies need not be exhausted if the administra-
tive body lacks authority to grant relief, if the relief granted would be
inadequate, if the administrative body is demonstrably hostile and any
petition would be futile, or if irreparable harm would be suffered during
the delay which exhaustion would entail.' These exceptions often apply
to land use cases because administrative zoning bodies typically are limited
to granting variance only from the physical, rather than the use, require-
ments of regulation and then only in cases of unnecessary hardship or
practical difficulty. Thus, some of the commonly accepted reasons for
SS 65553, 65567 (West Supp. 1981), respectively-while in San Diego it is likely that both
administrative and legislative approvals would have been required to develop property
within the open space planning area.
' Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 & n.36 (1978); R.
ELLICKSON & A.D. TARLOCK, supra note 5, at 77. See also note 110 infra.
101 S. Ct. at 1293 & n.12, 1294.
See R. ELLICKSON & A.D. TARLOCK, supra note 5, at 77.
See generally Comment, supra note 91, at 667-73.
" For a brief discussion of the reasons use variances are disfavored, see R. ELLICKSON
& A.D. TARLOCK, supra note 5, at 221. Generally, use variances are opposed because they
undermine the attempt to segregate uses and they appear to delegate legislative respon-
sibility to an administrative body.
Indiana was once (but may no longer be) an exception to allowing administrative bodies
to grant use variances. Prior to a 1979 statutory modification, boards of zoning appeals
in Indiana in first class cities were expressly authorized to grant use variances, IND. CODE
S 18-7-2-70 (1976) (repealed 1981), and other political subdivisions as defined in IND. CODE
S 18-7-2-61 (1976) (repealed 1981) were broadly authorized to grant "such variance from
the terms of the ordinance as will not be contrary to the public interest .... " IND. CODE
5 18-7-5-82 (1976) (repealed 1979). Under the prior statutes Indiana courts required landowners
to pursue administrative relief from allegedly unconstitutional land use regulation before
turning to judicial remedies. See, e.g., English v. City of Carmel, - Ind. App. - , 381
N.E.2d 540 (1978). While boards of zoning appeals occasionally have been reluctant to grant
a use variance when such relief would have been inconsistent with the existing zone classifica-
tion, see, e.g., Board of Zoning Appeals v. Koehler, 244 Ind. 504, 194 N.E.2d 49 (1963) (board
attorney advised that administrative relief for shopping center in residential district was
beyond board's jurisdiction; Indiana Supreme Court disagreed and granted relief), the courts
have been less reluctant to grant relief, see, e.g., Town of Homecraft v. Macbeth, 238 Ind.
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requiring exhaustion, such as preserving a sphere of administrative ac-
tion in deference to superior administrative expertise,99 simply do not fit
the land use system. Either the administrative remedy is too narrow to
57, 148 N.E.2d 563 (1958) (use variance ordered judicially after denial by board). Under
the statutory amendment of 1979, most boards of zoning appeals are expressly prohibited
from granting use variances; only a "metropolitan" board-that is, one associated with
a county having a consolidated city-or the municipal board for an "excluded city" in such
a county is authorized to grant such relief. Act of Apr. 6, 1979, Pub. L. No. 178, § 125,
1979 Ind. Acts 790, 84647 (formerly codified at IND. CODE S 18-7-4-918(d) (Supp. 1979) (repeal-
ed 1981) (current version at IND. CODE S 36-74-918(d) (Supp. 1981)).
At this point, it is an open question whether the Indiana courts will give substantive
effect to this subtle, but important, wording change in the enabling statute. One recent
case suggests that if a nonmetropolitan board of zoning appeals grants a use variance,
a court might still choose to uphold it either on the basis of statutory construction or the
constitution. Initially, in Strange v. Board of Zoning Appeals, - Ind. App. - 425 N.E.2d
720 (1981), the Indiana Court of Appeals found that Act of Apr. 6, 1979, Pub. L. No. 178,
S 125, 1979 Ind. Acts 790, 84647 (repealed 1981) prohibited the grant of a use variance
to a landowner who wished to establish a radio and television sales service shop in a residen-
tial district. On rehearing, the appellate court narrowly construed the 1979 prohibition
against use variances in S 18-7-4-918(d) to apply to boards of zoning appeals functioning
under area, but not advisory, planning law. Strange v. Board of Zoning Appeals, - Ind.
App. - 428 N.E.2d 1328 (1981). Under advisory planning law, a city or county could
create a board of zoning appeal for itself, IND. CODE S 18-7-5-69 (1976) (repealed 1979);
whereas, under area planning law, cities and counties were encouraged to cooperatively
establish unified zoning bodies, IND. CODE SS 18-74-1, -65 (1976) (repealed 1979). Given that
statutory construction, the appellate court invalidated the portion of the Shelby County
Zoning Ordinance which prohibited the grant of use variances as being inconsistent with
the general enabling legislation.
Curiously, the appellate court's decision on rehearing ignored a subsequent recodification
of the use variance prohibition in IND. CODE S 36-7-4-918(d)(4) (Supp. 1981). In general, the
advisory-area distinction is incorporated into the 1981 recodification of the Indiana planning
and zoning laws by means of section "headings:' See, e.g., IND. CODE S 36-7-4-201,-202 (Supp.
1981). In particular, S 918(d) carries an "area" heading, denoting applicability to area plan-
ning law. However, subsection 4 of S 918(d), which contains the use variance prohibition,
is not given a separate "heading:' A new provision in IND. CODE S 36-7-4-102 (Supp. 1981)
provides that "subsections ... without headings apply to area planning as well as advisory
planning.. :'On this basis alone the Strange court's limitation of the use variance prohibi-
tion to area boards of zoning appeals seems erroneous. Moreover, the appellate court's
reference to the legislature's intent in the 1979 reenactment to restate (without substan-
tive change) corresponding provisions of earlier law may now be overridden by IND. CODE
S 36-1-1-1 (Supp. 1981) which states:
This title is intended to codify, revise, or rearrange applicable or correspond-
ing provisions in prior statutes. A citation to a prior statute may be construed
as a citation to. the appropriate provision of this title if the prior statute is
reenacted in the same or restated form in this title.
Id. (emphasis added). Because the appellate court on rehearing overlooked the 1981 recodifica-
tion in title 36 and the substantive changes made therein, it may be unwise to rely upon
the appellate court's statutory construction as a basis for the continued availability of the
use variance in Indiana.
However, in deciding the Strange case on statutory grounds, the appellate court alluded
to possible constitutional arguments if the use variance mechanism was not available as
an "escape hatch," - Ind. App. at - 428 N.E.2d at 1331. The appellate court did
not decide on that basis because apparently "the issue ha[d] not been raised .. " Id. at
__ 428 N.E.2d at 1332.
See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW SS 20.01-.10 (1972); Jaffe, The Exhaustion
of Administrative Remedies, 12 BUFFALO L. REV. 327 (1963); Comment, supra note 91.
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be useful, as is the case of the variance, or the administrative remedy
is so ill-defined that the landowner is left to plumb the depths of discre-
tion through submission of detailed site plans, as is the case with much
subdivision regulation."0 Poorly defined discretion also may lessen the
viability of administrative relief in the zoning area to the extent that a
community's zoning ordinance is not truly self-administering. It is not un-
common to place undeveloped land in a low density zone on the zoning
map but to make it eligible for optional-but discretionary- higher den-
sity under the zoning text.0 ' Knowing how many options to pursue in
order to have exhausted available administrative remedies can be prob-
lematic. 2
An administrative exhaustion requirement is also out of step with the
position the Court has taken in section 1983 cases. While some members
of the Court may be predisposed toward some exhaustion requirement,'
the Court has held more than once that exhaustion of state judicial or
administrative remedies is not a prerequisite for recovery under section
1983. 1" Lower federal courts have applied this principle in land use cases, 0"
100 With regard to subdivision controls, Professor Krasnowiecki commented:
Thus, in the case of subdivision and site planning control, exhaustion is not
a matter of seeking available local relief, but rather of exploring the scope
of discretion left to the approving agency under the governing rules or stan-
dards ....
... Courts have refused to entertain an attack on a self-administering rule
until it has been applied in the context of a particular plan of development
and have even refused to entertain an attack when the rule has been applied
to a preliminary plan when it was clear that the same rule would be applied
to a final plan.
Krasnowiecki, Zoning Litigation and the New Pennsylvania Procedures, 120 U. PA. L. REV.
1029, 1044-45 (1972).
"I With respect to zoning, see Kmiec, Deregulating Land Use: An Alternative Free Enter-
prise Development System, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 28, 51-52 (1981).
"' Professor Krasnowiecki commented:
Faced both with underlying zoning restrictions which prevent his develop-
ment, and with an optional departure which is either too restrictive or leaves
too much to the unbridled discretion of local officials, [the landowner] may find
that a combined attack on the underlying zoning and the optional departure
is too complicated for the courts to understand or entertain. The courts are
likely to require that he apply for the optional departure before he will be
allowed to challenge the underlying zoning restrictions. The expense and delay
involved will generally force [the landowner] to accept whatever decision is
rendered by the local officials in his case.
Krasnowiecki, supra note 100, at 1047.
1"3 The Court noted the possibility that an individual may not be deprived of anything
until after administrative proceedings have been completed. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S.
564, 574-75 (1973). The question of whether administrative remedies must be exhausted
as a matter of course was nevertheless avoided in Gibson because the particular ad-
ministrative remedy was deemed inadequate because of the bias and indirect pecuniary
interest of the administrative body. Id. at 578.
" See, e.g., Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 312
& n.4 (1968); Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967); McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373
U.S. 668 (1963).
10. For example, exhaustion of administrative remedies was not required in Dahl v. Palo
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although, as Hernandez illustrates, they have not all followed the Supreme
Court's lead. '"
Moreover, the exhaustion requirement suggested by Hernandez should
not be accepted unthinkingly because it appears to undercut the general
thrust of Justice Brennan's dissent in San Diego. If, as Justice Brennan
reasoned, the just compensation requirement is not "precatory,"'' 7 and
compensation must be paid from the "date the regulation first effected
the 'taking,' "08 delaying compensation for an undetermined time while
the property owner pursues administrative remedies which do not include
compensation ' seems irreconcilable with the constitutional mandate. Ad-
mittedly, one might argue that no taking is effected until the adminis-
trative process is completed, but such semantics would contradict Justice
Brennan's opinion, which would require the government to tell the court
whether it will revoke or amend the regulation in order to enable the
court to assess damages."' Justice Brennan envisioned that even revok-
ing the regulation would not avoid the payment of compensation for a
temporary taking.
On balance, the Hernandez modification of San Diego is unsatisfactory
not because it is unreasonable to provide government with advance notice
of its potential liability, but because that notice would have to be given
Alto, 372 F. Supp. 647 (NJD. Cal. 1974), where the plaintiff alleged that her property had
been taken by downzoning and sought damages under the fourteenth amendment. The
court, relying upon two S 1983 decisions by the Supreme Court, held that there was no
need to seek an administrative variance. Id. at 649 & n.2.
108 See, e.g., Secret v. Brierton, 584 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1978); Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d
560 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970). The Ninth Circuit requires exhaustion
of state administrative remedies which are designed to forestall a deprivation of a con-
stitutional right. See Toney v. Reagan, 467 F.2d 953 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1130 (1973); Whitner v. Davis, 410 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1969).
101 S. Ct. at 1305 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
108 Id. at 1307.
109 Prior to San Diego, the landowner faced a similar problem when he raised the ques-
tion of invalidation while pursuing other administrative relief-such as a variance or con-
ditional use. Generally, the land use administrative process does not permit the introduc-
tion of evidence on the validity question. See Krasnowiecki, supra note 100, at 1050-52 &
n.79. Moreover, the validity question may be improper when the denial of administrative
relief is contested pursuant to a writ of certiorari, because certiorari is generally limited
to judicial review of the administrative record, R. ANDERSON, supra note 91, S 25.29, which
often contains little about the substantive invalidity of the regulation because the allega-
tion of invalidity would be beyond the jurisdiction of the conventional administrative zon-
ing proceeding, id. S 25.30; but see note 98 supra (Indiana law prior to 1981 allowed invalid-
ity question to be raised before administrative body).
110 Justice Brennan stated:
The government must inform the court of its intentions vis-a-vis the regula-
tion with sufficient clarity to guarantee a correct assessment of the just com-
pensation award. Should the government decide immediately to revoke or other-
wise amend the regulation, it would be liable for payment of compensation
only for the interim during which the regulation effected a "taking."
Id. at 1307 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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in the context of an existing land use system which is inadequately
designed to provide a legislative or administrative remedy. In this regard,
one commentator's suggestion that-the notice might take the form of a
simple letter has merit because it allows the existing system to be cir-
cumvented."' However, the suggestion conflicts somewhat with traditional
notions of administrative exhaustion which require that any matter which
is to be the subject of judicial review be fully argued and presented in
the administrative proceeding."1
Constructing an Acceptable Exhaustion Requirement
What needs to be done if exhaustion is to become part of the regulatory
taking analysis is to construct a legislative or administrative remedy which
deals directly with the landowner's substantive constitutional claim-
that is, a remedy which will preserve the economic viability of the
property."1 The existing land use administrative process does not pro-
vide such a remedy. Although a legislative rezoning could provide a con-
stitutionally adequate remedy, as the Hernandez opinion implies," requir-
ing a landowner to re-enter the legislative process perpetuates the "wait
and see" character of much land use regulation,"' and seemingly provides
little incentive for government to regulate constitutionally in the first
place. In fairness the landowner should not be made to endure another
legislative proceeding unless such a proceeding realistically might remove
the constitutional defect of the regulation and unless the landowner is
compensated for the delay associated with the proceeding.
The only nonjudicial remedy capable of addressing the substance of
the landowner's grievance under the existing land use system is legislative
rezoning. A legislative exhaustion remedy consistent with the dissenting
opinion in San Diego may be built upon the letter notice suggestion if
such notice places the burden upon the legislative body to convene new
proceedings on the matter within a reasonable time. If no proceedings
are convened, it can be assumed that the local government has no serious
interest in modifying its regulation and the landowner is free to pursue
... Hagman, supra note 89, at 134.
1,2 See, e.g., Bohn v. Watson, 130 Cal. App. 2d 24, 278 P.2d 454 (1954). In Bohn the court
held that a party to an administrative proceeding must present all arguments, issues, and
evidence before the administrative tribunal as a condition precedent to judicial review.
113 This discussion assumes that damages for a regulatory taking are unavailable through
the administrative and legislative processes. See note 117 infra.
11. 643 F.2d at 1200 n.27.
11 "Wait and see" zoning is the name given to the practice of placing undeveloped land
in unrealistic holding zones in order to increase the discretion of decisionmakers. See text
accompanying note 101 supra. See also NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING
THE AMERICAN CITY 206 (1968); MODEL LAND DEV. CODE 150-58 (1976).
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his judicial remedies. However, whether or not the local legislative body
reconvenes on the issue, if the landowner's damage claim is later found
to be justified, damages should be calculated from the date of the letter
notice, and not, as some authorities would require,' from the completion
of the exhaustion requirement. To do otherwise would substantially
diminish the deterrence of the compensation clause upon overzealous land
use regulation.
The Question of Damages
Perhaps the most perplexing issues left unanswered by San Diego are
what and how much the damages are for a regulatory taking. Justice Bren-
nan's opinion barely touched on the calculation of compensation, but validly
suggested leaving the states free to experiment.'17 Presumably, however,
the experimentation will be guided by the dissent's general remedial
outline.
Justice Brennan contemplated two sources of liability for a regulatory
taking. First, the government will be liable for damages accruing during
the interim period from the enactment of the regulation effecting a tak-
ing, to its rescission or amendment." ' Second, if the government chooses
to continue the offending regulation, it will be liable for, in Justice Bren-
nan's words, "proper measures of just compensation." '
Interim Damages: Compensation or Redistribution?
An initial stumbling block in the calculation of interim damages actual-
',' Hagman, supra note 89, at 135. The Hernandez court stated:
During the pendency of such proceedings to review and correct a zoning
classification that denies an owner an economically viable use of his property,
"[m]ere fluctuations in value during the process of governmental decisionmak-
ing, absent extraordinary delay, are "incidents of ownership. They cannot be
considered as a "taking" in the constitutional sense:"
643 F.2d at 1201 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. at 263 n.9 (quoting Danforth
v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 285 (1939))). The Supreme Court's comments in Agins re-
ferred to the loss in value associated with precondemnation activities and not the loss
in value associated with a legislative proceeding designed to correct a regulatory taking.
, 101 S. Ct. at 1308 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"' Id. at 1307. Although Justice Brennan described the interim period as running until
"the government entity chooses to rescind or otherwise amend the regulation," id. (foot-
note omitted), it is important to note that there always will be an interim period even
if the government chooses not to rescind or amend following the court's determination
that the regulation effected a taking. In the latter case, the interim period will end after
the government has had a reasonable opportunity to rescind or amend. Justice Brennan
recognized that the government might decide to continue the offending regulation. See
text accompanying note 119 infra.119 101 S. Ct. at 1308 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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ly pervades the entire issue of damages in the regulatory taking context:
Is the purpose of such damages the redistribution of burdens or compen-
sation for loss? The policy underlying the fifth amendment arguably sup-
ports awarding the fair rental value of the property during the interim
period, regardless of actual damages. It is also evident that Justice Bren-
nan believes that the amendment's purpose is fair redistribution of public
burdens, and not merely reimbursement for loss as in tort liability. He
observed that
[blecause police power regulations must be substantially related to
the advancement of the... general welfare, it is axiomatic that the
public receives a benefit while the offending regulation is in effect.
If the regulation ... is found to effect a "taking," it is only fair that
the public bear the cost of the benefits received . . 1
While the federal condemnation precedents cited by Justice Brennan
favor the payment of fair rental value for a temporary taking," federal1 '2
and state"n court decisions outside of the formal condemnation context
have not treated the issue uniformly. Some courts clearly hold that com-
pensation is to be measured not by the hypothetical rental value or benefit
received, but by the out-of-pocket loss suffered by the landowner."
Perhaps most disturbing of all from the standpoint of the redistribution
Id. at 1306 (citations omitted).
1 The cited cases are Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949); United
States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946); United States v. General Motors Corp.,
323 U.S. 373 (1945). 101 S. Ct. at 1307 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" Compare Cordeco Dev. Corp. v. Santiago Vasquez, 539 F.2d 256, 261 n.8 (1st Cir. 1976)
(refusing to base interim damages on "a simple rate of return ... during the period in
which plaintiff was deprived of its commercial use"), with Sixth Camden Corp. v. Township
of Evesham, 420 F. Supp. 709, 728-29 (D.N.J. 1976) (finding normal compensation for tem-
porary taking to be fair rental value).
1 Compare Keystone Assocs. v. State, 82 Misc. 2d 620, 371 N.Y.S.2d 814 (Ct. Cl. 1975)
(remedy for temporary taking is rental value of property), rev'd, 55 A.D.2d 85, 389 N.Y.S.2d
895 (App. Div. 1976), rev'd & remanded, 45 N.Y.2d 894, 383 N.E.2d 560, 411 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1978),
and Usdin v. State, 173 N.J. Super. 311, 414 A.2d 280 (1980) (standard of recovery is rental
value calculated in relation to land's most appropriate use (industrial) minus residual value
of regulated use (floodway)), with City of Austin v. Teague, 570 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. 1978)
(landowner's out-of-pocket loss is standard of recovery). Other states appear to waffle be-
tween rental value and actual loss. See, e.g., Brazil v. City of Auburn, - Wash. App.
-, 598 P.2d 1 (1979). Of course, some states are still waffling between invalidation and
compensation, regardless of how measured. See, e.g., Moviematic Indus. Corp. v. Dade County,
349 So. 2d 667, 672 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Mailman Dev. Corp. v. City of Hollywood,
286 So. 2d 614 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973). Some of the waffling has been eliminated by Justice
Brennan's opinion, which thus far has been received as if it were the opinion of the Court.
See Burrows v. City of Keene, - N.H. - , 432 A.2d 15 (1981) (creation of conservation
district and placement of plaintiff's land therein constituted taking requiring payment of
compensation, reasonable counsel fees, and twice the costs incurred upon appeal). The New
Hampshire court extensively discussed Justice Brennan's San Diego dissent with approval,
but expressly rested its decision solely upon the New Hampshire Constitution, perhaps
to avoid the nominal dissenting status of the Brennan opinion.
12. E.g., City of Austin v. Teague, 570 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. 1978).
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of public burdens is the manner in which the general compensation or
redistribution issue has been treated under section 1983. The Supreme
Court's decision in Carey v. Piphus1" indicates that "'[tlhe cardinal prin-
ciple [in the award] of damages [under section 1983] is that of compensa-
tion for the injury .. ' ", "
In Carey the section 1983 plaintiff sought damages for the improper
suspension of a student from school without adequate procedural due pro-
cess. The Court envisioned two sources of damage: first, injuries caused
by the suspension if it was improper, and second, damages inherent in
the wrong. With either type of damage, the plaintiff bears the burden
of proof, as injury cannot be presumed to occur. In short, some actual
injury, however intangible, must be proven. Nominal damages may be
paid for the denial of due process, however, because the right thereto
is "'absolute' in the sense that it does not depend upon ... a claimant's
substantive assertions."
Strictly applying Carey's tort liability focus to direct actions for
regulatory takings in the land use context may leave the landowner
without remedy. Carey suggests that a landowner must prove that the
offending regulation resulted in an actual loss. This may be difficult when
many of the landowner's losses, such as loss of financing commitments
or other contractual rights, are consequential." Similarly, if the regulated
land is undeveloped, the landowner's loss may be his inability to develop
the property toward some hypothetical use between the regulation's enact-
ment and its rescission or amendment. This concern is especially serious
since the subject of the harshest land use regulation is often undeveloped
rural or suburban land where no-growth fever or the public's appetite
for open space is usually greatest.
Carey suggests that a landowner also may claim damages from the in-
tangible injury resulting from the taking itself"-for example, his emo-
tional distress from years of wrangling with land use officials both in and
out of court. While that possibility is theoretically comforting, few land-
owners would undertake expensive litigation when the likely compensa-
tion depends solely upon a speculative award for the owner's mental
anguish over the constitutional abuse. Of course, the prospect of nominal
damages suggested by Carey provides even less solace. Moreover, it is
not even certain that nominal damages would be available for a regu-
latory taking because unlike the right in a procedural due process viola-
12 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
I Id. at 254-55 (quoting 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS S 25.1, at 1299 (1956) (em-
phasis in original).
435 U.S. at 266.
', See notes 138-44 & accompanying text infra.See 435 U.S. at 262-64.
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tion, the right to relief in a regulatory taking case is not absolute, but
rather depends upon the landowner's substantive assertion of non-
viability.1"'
Applying Carey to regulatory takings would undermine the policy of
redistributing public burdens and would render hollow any judicial recogni-
tion of government's liability for regulatory takings. A landowner would
be told in effect that a regulation can result in a taking if the rigorous
substantive standard of economic nonviability is met and that compensa-
tion is available for regulatory takings if actual losses are proven. That
the landowner's good faith compliance with the invalid regulation led him
to forfeit valuable contract rights and prevented any development of the
property upon which to calculate its lost rental value would be merely
part of the game."'
Thus, the damage issue left unaddressed by Justice Brennan may limit
the protection afforded property interests by the regulatory taking con-
cept. Indeed, one commentator already has suggested that states and
municipalities take "steps to limit their liability" through the "adoption
of damage tests ... that would require a property owner to show that
it had been injured in fact by any temporary taking.""' While implicitly
allowed under Carey, such a damage test raises the "danger of forgetting
that a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough
to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional
way of paying for the change.""'
Finally, it should be noted that the holding in Carey is not free of doubt.
For example, one writer doubts that the Court intended to limit section
1983 liability to tort remedies." Even if it did, Carey may allow a dif-
Meyer & Dolle, supra note 5, at 30; text accompanying notes 14-17 supra.
"' See note 144 infra. In Sixth Camden Corp. v. Township of Evesham, 420 F. Supp.
709 (D.N.J. 1976), the court was highly skeptical about the landowner's right to damages
for financing charges during the construction period delay, the increased cost of perma-
nent financing, and various other consequential items.
Professor Hagman would compensate when economic resources, such as actual construc-
tion or developer-financed infrastructure, are wasted. Hagman, Temporary or Interim Damage
Awards In Land Use Control Cases (Part II), 4 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 137, 142 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Hagman, Awards (Part II)]. However, drawing a distinction between
"soft" damage items-such as financing fees-and the "hard" damages associated with
manifest construction is unwarranted insofar as it interjects into the damage calculation
a distinction which has caused considerable difficulty and waste in other areas of land use
control, such as the determination of when the right to a building permit vests. See generally
Hagman, The Vesting Issue: The Rights of Fetal Development Vis a Vis the Abortions of Public
Whimsy, 7 ENVT'L L. 519 (1977).
" Bonderman, Comment, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., May 1981, at 11.
13 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
lu Carlisle, supra note 62, at 727. Carlisle concluded:
Section 1983, by the breadth of its language, has the capacity to accom-
modate change by providing a variety of remedies; however, if viewed in sim-
ple terms as creating [only tort liability] for innocent deprivations of newly
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ferent damage rule for regulatory takings since the Court indicated that
damage principles may differ depending on the constitutional right in
question. 3' For example, several federal appellate court decisions sup-
port a presumption of damage in cases of racial discrimination, denial of
voting rights, and denial of fourth amendment rights.'38
Calculation of Interim Damages
Thus far, this article's concern has been whether rental value (redistribu-
tion of public buidens) or actual loss (compensation) forms the basis of
interim damages. Assuming that rental value is to be paid, the difficult
secondary question of measurement is presented. For example, rental
value may be based on the landowner's actual use of the property, the
property's least economically viable use-below which it cannot be con-
stitutionally restrictedln-or on all uses economically available to the prop-
erty including its "highest and best use." The selection of a value stan-
dard is especially important because regulatory takings, unlike formal
condemnation, frequently affect undeveloped land.
The pre-San Diego case law on this issue is sparse and inconsistent.
Most courts recite the general rule that rental value is the payment for
a temporary taking without revealing by what standard the rental value
is to be determined."' One California decision acknowledged the general
rule, then eviscerated it by denying compensation because the landowner
merely held the property for investment."9 Similarly, a decision by the
recognized constitutional rights, either the statute itself must undergo change,
or strained limitations will evolve which will leave injured parties truly
"remediless" simply because the tort remedy is too harsh.
Id. at 735 (footnote omitted).
I' The Court stated:
In order to further the purpose of S 1983, the rules governing compensation
for injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights should be tailored
to the interests protected by the particular right in question-just as the
common-law rules of damages themselves were defined by the interests pro-
tected in the various branches of tort law.
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. at 258-59.
1 4 See id. at 264 & n.21. It is unclear after Carey whether these recoveries will be treated
by the Court as dependent upon the implied presence of actual damages, since the Court
expressly refused to intimate an opinion on the merits of these opinions by the courts
of appeals. Id. at 265.
"3 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. at 138 n.36.
'38 See, e.g., Sixth Camden Corp. v. Township of Evesham, 420 F. Supp. 709,728-29 (D.N.J.
1976).
13 City of Los Angeles v. Ricards, 10 Cal. 3d 385, 515 P.2d 585, 110 Cal. Rptr. 489 (1973).
In Ricards the city destroyed a bridge, plaintiff's only access to her property, by diverting
water. Id. at 387, 515 P.2d at 586, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 490. Plaintiff claimed that she was
unable to sell the inaccessible property. Id. at 388, 515 P.2d at 587, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
The court took the plaintiff quite literally and pointed out that the loss of access was not
a restraint on alienation. Id One suspects that the plaintiff was not really arguing that
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Texas Supreme Court made the rental value calculation entirely subjec-
tive by criticizing the failure to prove that the property would have pro-
duced any return to the landowner during the interim period.10 In con-
trast, a New York Supreme Court decision overturned a decision award-
ing a landowner lost profits and increased construction costs offset by
any increase in rents, and instead determined that the damages should
be the carrying charges during the interim period.' On this point a
separate opinion disagreed, noting that "projected return on the basis
of a development plan suitable to the property could be taken into ac-
count by experts, . in determining fair rental valfie [but it would be
error to measure] damages by the actual rent reserved in claimaint's lease
.... 14 The New York Court of Appeals, agreeing with the separate
opinion, reversed the reversal by the New York Supreme Court."" With
so little agreement on the applicable standard for calculating rental value,
it is not surprising that courts have received coolly landowner claims for
such consequential losses as increased construction and financing costs,
no matter how economically significant they might be."'
Under formal condemnation practice, land is valued at its "highest and
best use" or under "all available uses."" These two formulations are in-
tended to be identical, although juries and economists may treat them
differently.'" Under either formulation, condemnation value is not limited
the loss of access was a formal restraint on alienation, but merely that the loss of access
made it virtually impossible to market the property. See id. This confusion aside, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court seemingly felt that any landowner who merely held property for specula-
tion or investment appreciation could not possibly be entitled to damages for a temporary
taking. Thus, the court reversed the trial court's damage award. Id. at 391, 515 P.2d at
589, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
"0 City of Austin v. Teague, 570 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. 1978). For a commentary in agreement
with Teague, see Clark & Kidman, The Relationship of Just Compensation to the Land Use
Regulatory Power: An Analysis and Proposal, 2 PEPPERDINE L. REV. S79 (1974), in which the
authors state that for damages a landowner must "establish that his development was
imminent and delayed by regulations," id. at S100.
. Keystone Assocs. v. State, 55 A.D.2d 85, 389 N.Y.S.2d 895, rev'd 45 N.Y.2d 894, 383 -
N.E.2d 560, 411 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1978).
"' 55 A.D.2d at 90, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 899 (Greenblott, J., concurring in part & dissenting
in part).
Keystone Assocs. v. State, 45 N.Y.2d 894, 383 N.E.2d 560, 411 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1978).
'"See, e.g., Prince George's County v. Blumberg, 44 Md. App. 79, 407 A.2d 1151 (1979L(refusing to compensate developer for increases in interest rates during interim period
when building permits had been wrongly revoked), rev'd in part & remanded in part &
affjd in part, 288 Md. 275, 418 A.2d 1155 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1083 (1981). Prince
George's may not be dispositive of the issue, however, because the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals refused to rule on the remedial issues because the landowner failed to exhaust admin-
istrative remedies. Prince George's County v. Blumberg, 288 Md. at 296, 418 A.2d at 1167.
14 L. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN S 30 (2d ed. 1953).
Orgel suggested that the "all available uses" formula is to be preferred. Under this
formula, an "expert appraiser would refuse to limit his attention to value for any one use,
because he recognizes that such a limitation would tend to result in an undervaluation
of the property." Id. at 149 (emphasis in original). Orgel noted that courts and counsel
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to the property's existing use, because the market does not so limit value.
Except in rare cases, 7 property is "certainly adapted for some uses, prob-
ably adapted for other, more valuable uses, and possibly adapted for still
other, and still more valuable uses.""14 The only restriction on determin-
ing potential-use value under present condemnation practice is that the
uses not be so speculative as to command no market price."'
Consideration of potential land uses in regulatory takings has been
criticized by scholars as bestowing a windfall on landowners because of
public action."' Such criticism may be somewhat erroneous, since it is
based on both a partial misstatement of the usual eminent domain valua-
tion formulation and an overemphasis of the importance of public actions,
such as land use controls, on value. For example, one commentator has
stated that a condemned parcel's value is measured by its "highest and
best use under existing or reasonably probable land use controls.151 This
formulation suggests that economists appraising land value in condemna-
tion must exclude from consideration any land use not reasonably prob-
able under the community's land use policy. As even this commentator
acknowledged, however, economists do not limit their considerations to
existing land use policy.152 In view of the frequency with which zoning
amendments and variances are granted-often without adherence to the
announced standards 1 -it is hardly surprising that existing land use con-
for landowners may prefer the "best use" formulation in order to remind the condemna-
tion jury that the landowner's property value is not restricted to the actual use of the
property. Id.
Very few properties are peculiarly adapted for one particular use. Orgel observed:
We assume, for example, that property in the Wall Street district of New
York, should be valued for office-building purposes, since the possibility of
the lands becoming available for "lower uses" such as for farms and residences,
or for "higher uses" such as for gold mines is too remote to influence materially
the prices at which such land is actually bought and sold on the market place.
Id. at 147-48.
' Id. at 148.
' Id. S 31, at 154.
" Costonis, supra note 54, at 1044.
Id. at 1043 (emphasis in original).
15 Professor Costonis indicated that land use controls are not the only determinant of
land value when he observed: "If ... the condemnee succeeds in demonstrating that liberaliza-
tion of land use controls affecting his parcel is 'reasonably probable,' the further increment
of development potential will fall somewhere between the Allowable Use and the Highest
and Best Use Unrestricted by Public Regulation categories." Id. at 1051. The analysis in
the text is based on the assumption that "liberalization" includes not only reasonably prob-
able changes under an existing land use policy, but also reasonably probable changes in
the land use policy itself. In addition, even though he was "startled" by the fact, Professor
Costonis further observed that "in the index of Orgel's two-volume eminent domain treatise,
... only four references to zoning, two of which refer to footnotes in the main work and
two to textual passages of less than a paragraph's duration," can be found. Id. at 1043 n.100.
"" See, e.g., Dukeminier & Stapleton, The Zoning Board of Adjustment: A Case Study in
Misrule, 50 Ky. L.J. 273 (1962); Shapiro, Zoning Variance Power-Constructive in Theory,
Destructive in Practice, 29 MD. L. REv. 3 (1969); Note, The Effect of Statutory Prerequisites
on Decisions of Courts of Zoning Appeals, 1 IND. LEGAL F. 398 (1968).
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trols have been accorded little weight in land valuations. Courts
themselves regularly consider the possibility of a rezoning in determin-
ing value.11 Because such is the practice in formal condemnation pro-
ceedings, it seems strained to criticize similarly calculated damage awards
as "windfalls" in the regulatory taking context.
This is not to suggest that land use controls have no effect on value,
but merely to point out that such controls are but one factor to be con-
sidered, along with present and future uses of land adjacent to the parcel
being valued, availability of transportation, such municipal services as
water and sewer, the parcel's topography and soil, and numerous other
physical and market factors which may be relevant in a given case.
Misstating the valuation formulations naturally leads to overemphasis
on the importance of public activity in the land market. Such emphasis
was evident in Chief Judge Breitel's opinion in the New York Court of
Appeals in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.155 Refer-
ring to the public's "heavy investment" in railroads and connecting
transportation, Judge Breitel concluded that a taking claim premised on
an obligation to maintain as a landmark a publicly enhanced railroad ter-
minal must exclude public or societal values and be based solely on a
showing "that there was no possibility of earning a reasonable return
on the privately contributed ingredient of the property's value. 1  Such
analysis inadequately distinguishes the creation of value through direct
1 The drafters of the Model Land Development Code noted:
Because so many communities use their zoning regulations as temporary
holding devices-placing property in a low density classification with the im-
plicit understanding that a rezoning will be granted if they like the developer's
proposal-an artificially low value would result if only the temporary holding
classification were considered in determining value. Consequently, the courts
will consider the possibility of a rezoning in determining valuation.
MODEL LAND DEV. CODE S 5-303 note, at 203 (1976) (citing cases from several jurisdictions and
citing Zipser, Zoning Classification and Eminent Domain, 1 URB. LAW. 89 (1969)).
'- 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977), affid, 438 U.S. 104, rehearing
denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978).
15 Id- at 333, 366 N.E.2d at 1276, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 333. In fairness to Judge Breitel, his
comments seem to concentrate on direct public investment rather than public regulation.
He stated:
Even in the best of times, railroads were dependent on government-granted
monopolies for their rights of way, government grants for their land, and
government assistance for such projects as grade crossing eliminations.
Railroads were given franchises to use city streets without charge, often to
the detriment of neighboring residents and often without leaving the city power
to terminate the franchise. Through the years, Penn Central and its prede-
cessors have benefited mightily from this assistance.
Id. at 332, 366 N.E.2d at 1275-76, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 919 (citation omitted). In contrast, Pro-
fessor Costonis bemoaned the failure of condemnation practice to subtract from damage
awards the effect of public regulation. Specifically he stated that "[current practice] re-
quires that the award include both the land's value under existing land use restrictions
and the premium that the market places on it in anticipation of future zoning changes
that will increase its value." Costonis, supra note 54, at 1043 (emphasis in original).
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public subsidy and unharnessed private enterprise from the inability of
public regulation or "upzoning" to create value. For example, an upzon-
ing cannot increase the value of land unsuited to higher use in the
marketplace. Moreover, analyzing value in terms of public control
depreciates that part of a parcel's value which is linked to the private
activity surrounding it. 157
The misconception of land value as heavily dependent upon public
regulation has led to the proposal that the police and eminent domain
powers be integrated into the "accommodation power."1 This power would
compensate regulatory takings in relation not to the property's highest
and best use, but rather to its least economically viable use, or the prop-
erty's "Reasonable Beneficial Use."'159 The expressed motivation for so
limiting the landowner's remedy is to create "a sounder balance between
private property rights and public governance interests."'" However, the
balance in the accommodation power analysis clearly favors public
governance - a favoritism which seems unwarranted in view of the proli-
feration of harsh regulatory takings. The frequency with which local
governments use the police power rather than that of eminent domain
indicates that the existing balance of public and private rights hardly
has discouraged public regulation, and that the proposal does not move
far enough toward protection of private rights.
There remains another possible justification for the accommodation
power. Specifically, a strong argument can be made that the landowner
has no moral or legal entitlement to any land value whatever, because
he did nothing to create it. This position is rooted in the theories of the
nineteenth-century philosopher Henry George, and is premised on land's
inelasticity as a commodity. Thus, no tax on land will reduce its supply
in a competitive market."'1 Because everything a landowner earns from
the land itself, as distinguished from any improvements to the land, con-
stitutes economic rent," the question arises whether George's land value
recapture theory supports something less than full compensation for
regulatory takings. As is evident from the discussion which follows, the
157 See private windfall examples in WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS 15 (D. Hagman & D. Misczyn-
ski eds. 1978) [hereinafter cited as WINDFALLS].
15 Costonis, supra note 54, at 1023. Although Professor Costonis declined to define this
proposed power, i&., he described it as one "intermediate between the police and eminent
domain powers ... which, in providing fair compensation to meritorious claimants, affords
government a feasible alternative to the prohibitively expensive 'just compensation:" Id.
at 1034. It is designed to address a "class of regulatory measures that fits neither into
the traditional police nor eminent domain power niches and that escapes the confiscation
)bjection only by affording burdened landowners fair compensation in the form of appropriate
economic trade-offs:' Id. at 1058.
,, Id. at 1063.
' Id at 1049 n.125.
" See H. GEORGE, PROGRESS AND POVERTY 358-67 (50th anniversary ed. 1929).
US Kmiec, supra note 101, at 122.
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answer to this question is a matter of policy, not of law. Moreover, the
policy answers for interim and permanent damages may differ.
Compensation for interim damages should not be limited to the prop-
erty's least economically viable use as suggested by the accommodation
power analysis. This position is legally justified in part because invalid
regulation, being void, leaves the property legally unzoned, and hence
theoretically subject to any land use."
Beyond that somewhat legalistic notion, however, fairness requires that
a landowner be fully compensated for interim damages. While recaptur-
ing windfall land values may be a justifiable source of public revenue,
it should be recaptured overtly, pursuant to a comprehensive recapture
program."4 There is, after all, little justification for allowing some land-
owners to retain all land value while imposing a double penalty on the
landowner who happens to be the subject of a regulatory taking. This
unfortunate landowner would suffer both the expense of proving a reg-
ulatory taking under the elusive economic viability standard and the in-
dignity of being only partially compensated for doing so.
Full compensation for interim damages also promotes fairness in view
of the uncertainty costs imposed upon a landowner by a regulatory tak-
ing. Precedent in formal eminent domain cases has attempted to rectify
the uncertainty, foisted on a landowner by a temporary taking by increas-
ing the available compensation beyond that available for permanent
takings.6 5 For example, the Supreme Court has held that long-term ren-
tal value is not the sole measure of fair rental value for a temporary tak-
ing. Rather, as the Court noted in United States v. General Motors Corp.,"
it is appropriate to consider incidental losses not'as independent items
of damage, but as evidence of actual market rental value for temporary
occupancy." 7 While it may be possible to limit the holdings of General
1" See, e.g., Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy
Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 559, 193 A.2d 232, 24344 (1963). See generally 3 A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW
OF ZONING AND PLANNING S 36.02 (4th ed. 1980).
18 See WINDFALLS, supra note 157; Kmiec, supra note 101, at 126-27.
165 Some of the differences between temporary and permanent takings have been mitigated
by the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970,
42 U.S.C. SS 46014655 (1976). Unlike the judicial rule referred to in the text, the Act does
not increase the compensation for property taken, but rather reimburses persons for per-
sonal losses whenever a federally assisted acquisition of real property results in the displace-
ment of any person. Id § 4622, 4630. Pursuant to the Act, cash grants are available for
the relocation expenses of moving a business, id. § 4622, and for both owners, id. S 4623,
and tenants, id. § 4624, displaced from their homes.
18 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
187 Id. at 383. Writing for the Court in General Motors, Justice Roberts stated:
The question posed in this case then is, shall a different measure of com-
pensation apply where that which is taken is a right of temporary occu-
pancy....?...
... When [the government] takes the property, that is, the fee .... it must
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Motors and similar cases 6 to incidental damages associated with moving
materials from the property,' 9 inability to transfer the value of a going
concern,170 or repossession of the property after temporary displacement,
1
there appears to be no compelling reason to do so. It seems particularly
inappropriate to confine these holdings to their facts in view of Justice
Brennan's citation in San Diego of General Motors and similar cases as
examples in which the Court determined the appropriate measure of just
compensation for temporary use.'
The uncertainty imposed by temporary regulatory takings is hardly
less significant than that associated with formal temporary takings. In
fact, the uncertainty may be even greater since the landowner may have
no advance indication whether the regulatory taking will be temporary
or permanent. Under Justice Brennan's suggested approach in San Diego,
it is the government that decides whether to revoke or amend the offend-
ing regulation." Thus, the landowner will not know until the end of the
taking litigation whether or not he even will own a property interest that
is capable of development. He certainly will be in no position to obtain
loan commitments or to engage in realistic site planning.
Based on these legal and policy considerations, this analysis rejects the
limited compensation of the accommodation power and other interim
damage rules, 7 and proposes instead that landowners be awarded interim
pay [the landowner] for what is taken, not more; and he must stand whatever
indirect or remote injuries are properly comprehended within the meaning
of "consequential damage" as that conception has been defined in such cases....
It is altogether another matter when the Government does not take his
entire interest, but by the form of its proceeding chops it into bits, of which
it takes only what it wants, however few or minute, and leaves him holding
the remainder, which may then be altogether useless to him, refusing to pay
more than the "market rental value" for the use of the chips so cut off. This
is neither the "taking" nor the "just compensation" the Fifth Amendment con-
templates....
[In determining market rental value for temporary occupancy it is proper to
consider] the reasonable cost of moving out the property stored and prepar-
ing the space for occupancy by the subtenant. That cost would include labor,
materials, and transportation. And it might also include the storage of goods
against their sale or the cost of their return to the leased premises. Such
items may be proved, not as independent items of damage but to aid in the
determination of what would be the usual-the market-price which would
be asked and paid for such temporary occupancy ....
Id. at 380-83. See, a/so.L. ORGEL, supra note 145, 5 80, at 340.
I"8 See, e.g., United States v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 339 U.S. 261 (1950); United
States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946).
1 323 U.S. at 383.
170 Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949).-
" See 323 U.S. at 383 (suggesting that fair rental value for temporary taking may in-
clude cost of returning goods to premises).
101 S. Ct. at 1307.
17I !d.
" Professor Hagman has argued for a lesser level of interim damages on the theory
that a regulatory taking leaves the landowner in possession of the property with some
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damages equal to the property's fair rental value, determined in relation
to all economically available uses of the property and the peculiar uncer-
tainty costs confronted by a landowner subject to a temporary regulatory
taking,17 including increased construction and financing costs.
Permanent Damages Without Acquisition of a Property Interest
Calculating damages for permanent takings is no less difficult than for
temporary takings. The heart of the difficulty is whether the government
is compensating the landowner or rather acquiring a fee or some lesser
property interest. If the permanent award is viewed as damages, rather
than purchase price, all the uncertainties surrounding the interim damage
calculation return. For example, courts must decide whether the damage
payment is compensation for actual loss or a redistribution of public
burdens.7 ' Similarly, the value basis for the damage award must be agreed
upon.
Accepting the arguments made previously for the redistribution of
public burdens, the sole question to be resolved is the applicable value
standard. As was suggested earlier,77 the interim and permanent damage
calculations diverge on the value standard. Unlike the interim damage
situation, when permanent damages are at issue, the regulating body has
devised a land use restriction with knowledge that it will effect a taking.
Uncertainty is no longer a major factor because the landowner is to receive
full compensation in the interim up to the time when the government
decides to rescind or continue the offending regulation. If the govern-
ment decides to continue the regulation, the permanent calculation itself
signifies the government's decision to maintain stringent control over the
residual use rights. Hagman, Awards (Part II), supra note 131, at 139. He would pay only
"negotiated" fair rental value-that is, an amount private parties would "have negotiated
if it [the length and extent of the government's damaging conduct] was known in advance
including the fact that the take was only going to be temporary[.r' Id. at 141. Hagman
suggests that his proposed interim damage rule is based on Kimball Laundry Co. v. United
States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949), and General Motors, the formal temporary condemnation precedents
cited by Justice Brennan. However, as discussed earlier, these cases represent an
enlargement-not a constriction-of compensation for formal temporary takings. See, e.g.,
General Motors Corp. v. United States, 323 U.S. at 380-83, quoted in note 167 supra.
In addition, Professor Hagman's position seems questionable on the policy grounds sug-
gested in the text. Specifically, something less than full rental value is an isolated windfall
recapture, ignores the uncertainty foisted by the temporary taking upon the landowner,
and slights the admonitory purpose full compensation serves against overzealous land use
regulations. In this regard, it is important to remember that a regulatory taking is not
a voluntarily negotiated agreement among private parties, but the involuntary imposition
of an errant government.
175 Although the government faces uncertainty, the courts' concern should be the land-
owner's uncertainty. Text accompanying note 56 supra.
176 See text accompanying notes 120-36 supra.
1 Text accompanying note 163 supra.
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property's development, and thus to pay accordingly. Moreover, as dis-
cussed below,178 permanent damage awards risk overpayment, but interim
damage awards do not. Therefore, this article advocates applying the least
economically viable use value standard in the permanent calculation. This
standard satisfies the constitutional minimum by supplying the value in-
crement necessary to cure the regulatory taking 7 9
Advocates of land use deregulation'" may decry application of the
minimal acceptable constitutional standard with a variation of the argu-
ment previously directed toward the remedial inadequacy of invalidation.
For example, it can be argued that governmental excesses in land use
regulation are facilitated by its limited liability. While the argument has
considerable validity, especially in states like California where private
property scarcely exists but in name, 8' it is unsatisfactory insofar as it
seeks to redress all existing land use inequities through an adjustment
in compensation practice.
Although government's failure to compensate landowners for regulatory
abuses may be the most glaring fault of the existing system, it is by no
means its only one. Commentators,' including this writer, have examined
the unfairness, inefficiency, uncertainty, and inflexibility of the existing
land use system. These examinations reveal that if deregulation is in fact
merited, it is best handled through comprehensive legislative reform that
properly demarcates the appropriate spheres of public and private deci-
sionmaking. Increasing the permanent compensation available to land-
owners cannot sensitively and properly divide public and private
responsibility." Thus, using the highest possible value standard will
ultimately satisfy neither the deregulation advocates nor those' who
'7' Text accompanying notes 185-86 infra.
' Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 131, 138 n.36 (1978).
"' See, e.g., B. SIEGAN, LAND USE WITHOUT ZONING (1972); Ellickson, Alternatives to Zon-
ing: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. Cm. L. REV. 681
(1973); Kmiec, supra note 101; Krasnowiecki, Abolish Zoning, 31 SYRACUSE L. REV. 719 (1980);
Lefcoe, California's Land Planning Requirements: The Case for Deregulation, 54 S. CAL.
L. REV. 447 (1981).
"' California has become noted for the wipeout of land developers. See Avco Community
Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Comm'n, 17 Cal. 3d 785, 553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 386 (1976). Professor Hagman described the situation in California as follows:
[Tihe state [is] without any comprehensive scheme of control. Local, regional
and state agencies, many of them new and many of them charged to.protect
a specialized aspect of the public weal, however, may exercise substantial con-
trol. Each agency has a kind of veto power. Often hostile to developers, these
agencies do not conceive of themselves as in a kind of partnership relation-
ship with developers in the production of the built environment.
Hagman, Development Agreements, 3 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 65, 66 (1980).
"' See sources cited note 180 supra.
C' f. Costonis, supra note 54, at 1048-49 (advocating legislative action to resolve com-
pensation issues).
1" E.g., Costonis, supra note 54.
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desire merely incremental readjustment in the balance between public
governance and private rights. So long as government is authorized by
enabling legislation to regulate land use under the vacuous general welfare
standard, permanent damage awards should not be calculated to subvert
the legislative will covertly by substituting eminent domain measurements
for those under the police power. The imperfections of the existing land
use system are so monumental that it deserves to be overtly subverted,
repealed, and reconstituted.
Finally, limiting permanent damage awards to the amounts necessary
to cure the constitutional deprivations lessens the concern of damage over-
payment. Such concern stems from the possibility of conferring a wind-
fall on the landowner in the event the regulation is subsequently
repealed.'85 The interim calculation, by its very nature, does not involve
the overpayment problem. While it might be possible to avoid the prob-
lem by paying permanent damages periodically, the administrative costs
likely would be prohibitive. Presumably, an economist could factor into
a lump-sum payment the likelihood of future decontrol, although the
number of variables, including the turnover of officeholders,", may severe-
ly undermine the accuracy of such predictions. Thus, the simplest solu-
tion is to limit the permanent compensation paid by the value standard
applied.
Permanent Damages with Acquisition of a Property Interest
Permanent damages also could take the form of the purchase price for
the property interest taken. This alternative would avoid a separate in-
terim damage calculation since interest would be added to the purchase
price award from the date of the offending regulation's enactment.'i Of
course, this would slight the policies outlined in this article which favor
a separate interim damage calculation."
Under this view, the property interest taken would largely determine
. WINDFALLS, supra note 157, at 296-97. See generaUy Bosselman,Property Rights inLand.
New Statutory Approaches, 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 681 (1975).
"M Professors Ellickson and Tarlock have noted that the turnover in officeholders may
lessen the incentive for rational decisionmaking allegedly inherent in the payment of com-
pensation. In this regard, they observed:
Even if municipal liability for interim damages were to be imposed, would
the city officials who adopt an unconstitutional program T1 fully weigh city
liabilities that do not accrue until after T5? (Compare how today's city council
may grant generous unfunded pension rights to city workers, and leave to
tomorrow's city council the problem of funding them.) Are the efficiency gains
that will accrue from holding cities liable for interim damages likely to ex-
ceed the administrative costs of applying that remedy?
R. ELLICKSON & A.D. TARLOCK, supra note 5, at 172.
1? Id. at 171.
"' See text accompanying notes 163-73 supra.
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the compensation paid. As Justice Brennan intimated, the government
which invalidly takes by regulation may decide to condemn formally the
fee interest in the property.189 Through fee ownership the government
could preserve land in its present state or resell it to a landowner who
would undertake some publicly desired use. Alternatively, if the govern-
ment's interest in the property was directed more to the timing than to
the type of development, it could purchase a short-term leasehold or a
less-than-fee interest, such as an easement, covenant, or servitude, for
a defined period. Of course, if the government wished to prevent a specific
type of development, it could acquire the relevant development rights
with a permanent less-than-fee interest.
The purchase of less-than-fee interests or development rights has a
number of benefits, the primary ones being to lower acquisition costs and
long-term holding costs since the property continues to produce tax
revenue. In addition, to the extent that the development rights remain-
ing in private ownership are economically viable, the land may generate
some private income.
However, the purchase of development rights is not trouble-free. First,
it diminishes the property's alienability by fragmenting ownership. Sec-
ond, the historical success of development right purchases in this coun-
try is, at best, checkered.'" Third, valuing these interests may be more
difficult than valuing fee interests, 9 ' although one commentator succinct-
ly stated that a development right's value equals the difference between
the land's value in its present use and that as developed.192
One land use scholar has raised two objections to the permanent
damage-acquisition approach. The first is that the acquisition alternative
allows the government to avoid its taking problem too cheaply. '93 Specific-
ally, it allows the government to purchase those development rights
necessary to cure an invalid taking at a cost roughly equal to the dif-
ference between the value of the property as invalidly regulated and its
value under valid regulation. This it is argued is "rather an enormous
advantage for government," '194 since the government must pay less than
it would if it were required to purchase the fee.
Surely the purchase of the limited interest necessary to validate the
, 101 S. Ct. at 1307-08.
For example, scenic easements acquired by the National Park Service have been dif-
ficult to police and to enforce judicially. D. MANDELKER & R. CUNNINGHAM, PLANNING AND
CONTROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT 923-26 (1979).
"I Id. at 926-27. See generally Cunningham, Scenic Easements in the Highway Beautifica-
tion Program, 45 DEN. L.J. 168 (1968).
I" Eckert, Acquisition of Development Rights: A Modern Land Use Tool, 23 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 347, 349 (1969).
'" WINDFALLS, supra note 157, at 293-94.
1N Id. at 294.
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regulation does greatly advantage the regulator. It is hard to understand,
however, why this comes as a shock. The advantage to the government
is coextensive with its power to regulate under the police power. Perhaps,
the criticism directed at the regulatory purchase of property interests
is traceable to a belief that a rational land use system should both fully
recapture windfalls and fully compensate wipeouts.195 Because the pur-
chase of a limited property interest barely mitigates the wipeout and
leaves the windfall question unaddressed, the existing system is highly
deficient in this particular regard. Nevertheless, as suggested earlier,1"
to the extent that the existing system prevails, the compensation ques-
tion should be addressed in that context.
The second objection, however, is addressed directly to the existing
system: that is, the arguable constitutional infirmity in allowing govern-
ment to use its regulatory power to purchase a property interest after
devaluing the property by regulation.197 Ample precedent prohibits such
regulatory abuse in the context of formal eminent domain acquisitions. 9 '
Overall, the stated objections mirror a difficulty encountered earlier
in the calculation of permanent damages: whether the market value of
the acquired fee or less-than-fee interest should be determined in reference
to all economically available, but undeveloped, uses, or only the least
economically viable use. Without repeating the previous arguments, there
would appear no reason to distinguish permanent damages and perma-
nent acquisitions. Within the context of the existing land use system, the
two types of permanent calculations should be treated consistently. Hence,
the acquisition price for either fee or less-than-fee interests would be deter-
mined from the property's least economically viable use.'" However, the
mere statement of the rule reveals that consistent treatment of the per-
manent calculation creates the impermissible inconsistency between the
damage payment for regulatory takings and formal eminent domain ac-
quisitions referred to above."' To avoid such inconsistency, it is probably
" Id. at 20, 24.
19 Text accompanying notes 182-85 supra.
191 WINDFALLS, supra note 157, at 239-94.
, See, e.g., City of Plainfield v. Borough of Middlesex, 69 N.J. Super. 136, 173 A.2d 785
(1961). In Plainfield the landowner and the municipality could not reach a voluntary agree-
ment with respect to the sale of the landowner's property. The city then rezoned the tract
for parks, playgrounds, and schools, and one month later sought to condemn the property.
The New Jersey court held that the municipality had improperly used the zoning author-
ity to lower the price of the property. See also Hagman, Planning and Regulatory Acquisi-
tion, in WINDFALLS, supra note 157, at 222-55.
'" Thus, with respect to permanent damages or permanent acquisitions, the position
supported here generally coincides with that proposed by Professor Costonis. See Costonis,
supra note 54. In addition, the proposal is in line with that suggested by the American
Law Institute. See MODEL LAND DEV. CODE S 5-303(5) & note (1976).
w' See text accompanying notes 193-95 supra. See also Burrows v. City of Keene,
N.H. -, 432 A.2d 15 (1981). The Burrows court implicitly disdained any difference be-
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best to adopt the suggestion that any permanent award be viewed as
damages rather than the acquisition of a property interest.
CONCLUSION
While the supposed absence of a final judgment in San Diego left the
Court short of its destination, the importance of the opinion cannot be
understated. Justice Brennan's well-written dissent diminishes any doubt'
about the direction of the Court as then constituted on the regulatory
taking issue after Penn Central: police power regulation can be a taking
within the meaning of the just compensation clause of the fifth amend-
ment. Moreover, for the first time an apparent majority of the Court has
indicated that the compensation requirement in the fifth amendment is
mandatory and not merely precatory. Invalidation will not suffice, whether
the government formally condemns property or implicitly condemns by
regulation.
While Justice Brennan's statement that "once there is a 'taking' com-
pensation must be awarded" 20 may appear to establish absolute govern-
ment liability, there is little reason not to apply the immunities established
in analogous cases under section 1983. The policy of balancing public discre-
tion and private rights is so similar in both contexts that little would
be gained from separate treatment.
A requirement that a landowner who has suffered a regulatory taking
exhaust legislative and administrative remedies is unjustified if such
remedies are not designed to deal with the landowner's substantive claim
and if the landowner is not compensated for the damages which accrue
while remedial actions are pursued. Because none of the legislative and
administrative remedies of the existing land use system fulfill both these
requirements, none is satisfactory and coincident with Justice Brennan's
opinion. Nevertheless, it may be possible to construct an adequate non-
judicial remedy by using the rezoning mechanism and minimizing the
burden on the landowner through the provision of compensation during
the rezoning process and placing the responsibility for the pursuit of a
tween the payment available for permanent regulatory acquisitions and permanent emi-
nent domain acquisitions. The court stated:
From the outset, it was plain that the city wished that the plaintiffs land
be devoted to open space.... The city, however, would not pay a reasonable
price for the property, electing instead to offer to purchase the property for
a sum representing the land's value based on the city's intended use of the
land rather than the price to which the plaintiffs were entitled, which was
one reflecting the land's highest and best use.
Id at - , 432 A.2d at 21.
01 See, e.g., note 17 supra.
101 S. Ct. at 1305 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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rezoning upon the municipality after notice of a taking claim is received
from the landowner.
On the damage issue, the identity of interests in the immunity area
between the section 1983 cases and those brought directly under the fifth
amendment does not prevail. Supreme Court precedent indicates that com-
pensation for actual loss is the purpose of section 1983. In contrast, both
Justice Brennan and sound land use policy suggest that redistribution
of public burdens lies at the heart of the constitutional prohibition against
takings without just compensation. These positions and the case
precedents themselves are not irreconcilable, however, and in the
regulatory taking context, they should be reconciled in favor of
redistribution.
Damage calculation for regulatory takings is also not self-evident. Ex-
isting case law has evaded the value standard to be applied. Thus, time
and again, opposing sides assume their natural positions without any con-
sistent guiding standard. Landowners argue for valuation at highest and
best use while regulators urge valuation at existing use, which more often
than not is undeveloped-a status probably traceable to the offending
regulation. On the sidelines, unduly emphasizing the effect of public and
regulatory activity on land value, certain scholars argue for the least
amount of compensation acceptable under the Constitution.
Thus, the compensation issue has become a stalking horse for those
of vastly different views on individual freedom and the relative impor-
tance of property rights to protection of that freedom. By their narrow
focus on the inequities of current compensation practice, both sides have
left uncorrected the overall failings of the existing land use system. Con-
sequently, landowners continue to be inadequately compensated and
legislatures fail to re-examine comprehensively the land use control
system.
If compensation within the existing system is treated discretely from
overall land use reform, it is not difficult to outline some general prin-
ciples that should apply. First, interim damages should equal the fair rental
value of the property under all economically available uses. In making
the calculation, the court should consider significant items of consequen-
tial loss such as the forfeiture of valuable contract rights and loan com-
mitments. Interim damages so calculated take full cognizance of both the
legal nullity of invalid regulations and the inherent unfairness and uncer-
tainty such regulations impose upon the landowner.
Second, permanent damages should be provided only for the use value
that is in fact constitutionally infringed. Paying damages for the least
economically viable use maintains an acceptable balance between the police
and eminent domain powers and lessens the chance of overpayment in
the event of subsequent decontrol. While permanent damages may also
be treated as an acquisition of a fee or less-than-fee property interest,
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such characterization raises both the specter of an unconstitutional
regulatory acquisition and such other problems as fragmentation of owner-
ship and the difficult enforcement and valuation of development right
interests.
These damage principles are not immutable. However, they should serve
as a basis for further discussion as the states take up Justice Brennan's
invitation to experiment with compensation. Experimentation will be
healthy so long as no one overlooks Justice Brennan's qualification that
any procedure or remedy chosen comport with the Constitution and "mean-
ingfully allow a landowner to challenge a regulation that allegedly effects
a 'taking,' and recover just compensation if it does so."23
I Id. at 1308.

